





This paper presents an analysis of Japanese mone-
tary policy, and concentrates on the operating mecha-
nisms used by the Bank of Japan in conducting policy.
References are made to U.S. monetary policy in an
attempt to highlight the major similarities and differ-
ences between the respective monetary policies. The
major conclusion is that although there are some
interesting differences, the two central banks’ daily
operating procedures are very similar. Both monetary
authorities basically use the interbank market interest
rate as their policy instrument. Therefore, any major
differences in Japanese and U.S. macroeconomic per-
formance that can be attributed to the behavior of the
two monetary authorities are not due to dissimilar
operating procedures. Profitable research attempting
to discover reasons for differences in monetary policy
should concentrate on understanding the political na-
ture of the monetary institutions and the political
constraints that are associated with each country’s
institutional framework. Such considerations, however,
are far beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses
chiefly on comparable operating procedures and macro-
economic performance.
The conclusion that both the United States and
Japanese central banks use similar operating proce-
dures casts doubt on the importance of many criticisms
directed at the Federal Reserve. These criticisms often
emphasize poorly constructed operating procedures as
being responsible for perceived failures of U.S. mone-
tary policy. For example, Friedman [1982] states that
one of the five major points of monetarist policy is that
“monetary authorities should avoid trying to manipulate
either interest rates or exchange rates.” The basic idea
* This paper was written while the author was a Visiting Scholar,
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan. Discus-
sions with Hideo Hayakawa, Yoshiharu Oritani, Chihiro Sakuraba and
Yoshio Suzuki of the Bank of Japan, Minoru Okada and Hirozumi
Tanaka of the Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd., and Kenji Kariya of the
Norin Chukin Bank have been very helpful. Needless to say, the
opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do
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that is often stressed in many criticisms of this type is
that an interest rate instrument is inconsistent with the
objectives of long-term monetary control and price
stability. Further, the Japanese experience is often
cited as the shining example among advanced econo-
mies of achieving monetarist objectives. Yet, as it is
shown below, the Bank of Japan uses an interest rate
instrument in achieving the objectives of its monetary
policy. While there may exist differences in the relative
efficiency of various operating procedures, these differ-
ences do not account for the variation in performance
between the central banks of the United States and
Japan. Concentrating on operating policies is probably
counterproductive in trying to understand the relative
performance of each monetary authority.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section
II, the macroeconomic performances of the United
States and Japan over the last decade are compared and
contrasted. Japan is observed to have had lower,
although not less variable, inflation and to have had
higher and less variable real output growth. In Section
III interest rates are examined. With the exception of
the behavior of the long-term government bond rate,
interest rate behavior in both countries appears quite
similar. Section IV includes a detailed look at the
Japanese interbank market and discusses some of the
operations conducted by the Bank of Japan. The behav-
ior of this market is quite similar to the behavior of the
U.S. federal funds market. Section V discusses Japa-
nese monetary policy in more depth, while Section VI
presents a simple model that captures a number of
essential characteristics of Japanese monetary policy:
The model is similar in spirit to McCallum’s [1981]
investigation of interest rate pegs and McCallum and
Hoehn’s [1983] investigation of various U.S. operating




PERFORMANCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN (1975-l 985)
In this section a brief overview of the macroeconomic
performance of the United States and Japan is present-
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ed for the period 1975-1985. This sample is chosen to Bank of Japan could initiate monetary policy in a manner
avoid the contaminating influence of the first oil price comparable to policy in the United States. Prior to the
shock which had a differential impact on the two 1970s, the money market in Japan was not nearly as
countries. Also, it was not until the mid-1970s, with the active or diversified as in the United States.
creation of large government bond issues, that the Charts la, lb, and 2 and Table I depict the relevant
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MONETARY GROWTH AND INFLATION
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data. In comparing monetary aggregates, U.S. Ml is
compared with Japanese M2 + CD, although Japanese
Ml statistics are given in parenthesis in Table I. The
different aggregates are used for two reasons. One
reason is that these are the aggregates that each
Table I
MACROECONOMIC DATA
Sample 1975:1 - 1985:4 (Quarterly Data)
Japan U.S.
Average real output growth (percent) 4.30 2.52
Standard deviation of real output
growth 1.10 3.06
Average inflation (percent,
using GNP deflator) 3.78 6.86
Standard deviation of inflation 2.63 2.31
Average monetary growth (percent)
1 10.26 (6.79) 7.36
Standard deviation of money growth 2.54 (4.53) 2.08
Sample 1981:1 - 1985:4
Average real output growth (percent) 3.94 2.35
Standard deviation of real output
growth .87 3.21
Average inflation (percent) 1.78 5.48
Standard deviation of inflation 1.12 2.40
Average monetary growth (percent) 8.28 (4.30) 8.19
Standard deviation of money growth 1.19 (2.87) 2.39
1. Money growth for Japan is M2 + CD, while for the United
States it is Ml. The Ml figure for Japan is included in
parenthesis.
1982 1983 1984 1986 1986
(Year)
central bank pays the closest attention to and generally
uses as an intermediate target. The other reason is that
in terms of controllability and the implications for a well-
defined price level, Japanese M2 and U.S. Ml are quite
similar (the CD component in Japan is under quantity
restrictions and is relatively small). Specifically, most of
the components of these two aggregates are subject to
reserve requirements and binding interest rate ceilings.
Unlike Japanese M2, U.S. M2 contains many compo-
nents that have market determined interest rates and
no reserve requirements, implying that U.S. M2 does
not meet the requirements given in Patinkin [1961] and
Fama [1983] for determining a well-defined aggregate
price level.
The data shows that Japanese money growth has
been less erratic than U.S. money growth. ‘This is
visible in the charts and is confirmed by the standard
deviations of money growth in Japan and the United
States of 1.19 and 2.39 over the second half of the
sample, a period reflecting extremely low Japanese
inflation rates of less than 2 percent on average. The
standard deviation for the entire sample in some sense
overstates Japanese monetary variability, since Japan
was following a gradual reduction in its rate of money
growth. Therefore, differences in money growth from
its mean indicate variability some of which is merely a
reflection of a gradual disinflationary policy.
This gradual slowdown in money growth is reflected
by lower inflation rates in Japan than in the United
States of 3.78 versus 6.86 for the entire sample and
1.78 versus 5.48 over the last five years. The reduction
in inflation was accomplished without significantly af-
14 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1986fecting real output growth. In contrast the United
States reduced its money growth from 6.9 percent in
1979-1980 to 2.4 percent in 1980-1981.
1 This resulted
in a slowdown in inflation and a severe decline in output
growth. Also, real activity is much less variable in Japan
than in the United States as measured by standard
deviations of 1.10 and 3.06, respectively. When com-
paring the relative performance of the two economies,
it is clear why many regard Japan as an outstanding
example of sensible monetary policy.
III.
A COMPARISON OF INTEREST RATE BEHAVIOR
The basic behavior of interest rates is depicted in
Charts 3a and 3b and Table II. Regarding the short-
term money market, overall interest rate behavior in
both countries appears to be quite similar. Rates in the
United States are somewhat higher and more variable
reflecting higher levels of inflation and perhaps more
variable monetary policy. The rates in both countries
show a good deal of flexibility and are characterized by
similar correlation coefficients.
The lower variability of Japanese money market
rates may also be due to greater restrictions on
movements in rates in the call market and bill discount
markets prior to 1979.
2 Many of these restrictions
prohibited interbank rates from changing on a daily
basis, but still allowed for flexibility on a biweekly basis.
The use of quarterly data may effectively mask these
rigidities since the money market rates in Japan show
even less variability over the 1981:1-1985:4 period
when interbank rates fluctuated freely. Also, in the
1970s the Bank of Japan probably used its interest rate
instrument more aggressively to bring down money
growth and inflation than did the Federal Reserve.
3
This would tend to offset the effects of institutional
rigidities on short-term Japanese interest rates when
analyzing quarterly data.
Although the behavior of money market rates shows
great similarity in the two countries, the behavior of
long-term yields on government bonds is quite differ-
ent. In the United States, long-term bond yields fluctu-
ated a good deal more, as depicted by a standard
deviation of 2.30 versus a standard deviation of .89 for
Japan. Also, these yields are much more highly corre-
1 These figures are for effective Ml growth and are taken from
Broaddus and Goodfriend [1984].
2 For more detail see Cargill [1985] and Fukui [1986].
3 For a detailed discussion concerning the Federal Reserve’s operat-
ing procedures in the 1970s see Hetzel [1981].
lated with other interest rates in the United States than
in Japan. Again, one may conjecture that the high
degree of regulation that existed in the Japanese bond
market during the 1970s is responsible. Prior to 1975
there were relatively few long-term government bonds
and during the late 1970s long-term bonds were mar-
keted entirely to financial institutions who were “re-
quested” not to resell them in the secondary market.
Gradually as the government tried to market more
debt it was forced to liberalize subscription rates and
resale arrangements if entire issues were to receive
subscriptions. For instance, in April 1977, members of
the government bond purchasing syndicate were per-
mitted to resell bonds after holding them for one year
and in 1978 the Bank of Japan repurchased bonds on an
auction basis. In May 1980, government bonds could be
resold after they were listed on the securities ex-
change, amounting to a holding period of seven to nine
months, and in 1981 the holding period was shortened
to 100 days. Furthermore, the initial subscription yield
was gradually liberalized and the difference between
this yield and the yield in the secondary market has
become virtually nonexistent. Moreover, if one exam-
ines only the last five years of the sample the compara-
tive statistics are quite similar. Long-term bonds have a
standard deviation of .75 in Japan as compared to 1.51
in the United States and have a correlation coefficient
with the three-month market rate of .47 as compared to
.88 for the United States.
With the loosening of regulations in both domestic
and foreign exchange markets and the large increase in
government debt, the Japanese bond market has be-
come the second most active bond market in the world.
This growth is also reflected in the money markets
giving Japan well diversified and deep markets for
borrowing and lending. Although these markets are not
as large or diversified as markets in the United States,
the differences in the money and bond markets can not
be responsible for difference in the performance of the
Japanese and U.S. monetary authorities.
4
IV.
THE JAPANESE INTERBANK MARKET
Overview
In order to understand Japanese monetary policy it is
essential to examine the workings of the Japanese
4 The above discussion has concentrated on deregulation in the long-
term government bonds market. However, many other liberalization
measures have taken place in this same period, e.g., the liberaliza-
tions in the markets of CDs, BAs and the conversion of foreign
currency into yen. The working of the interbank market is strongly
affected by the working of these new markets, and it might be useful
to examine this interaction. However, this point is not discussed
explicitly here since several papers are already available on this issue.
See Cargill [1985] and Fukui [1986], among others.
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INTEREST RATES
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Average discount rate (percent) (d) 5.74 8.74
Standard deviation discount rate 1.40 2.61
Average interbank rate (percent)
1 (i) 7.07 9.54
Standard deviation interbank rate 2.09 3.67
Average 3-month rate (percent)
2 (r3) 7.14 8.67
Standard deviation 3-month rate 1.73 2.96
Average lo-year bond rate (percent) (r10) 7.85 10.31
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1. The interbank rate in Japan is the overnight call market rate
while in the United States it is the overnight Federal funds
rate.
2. The 3-month rate for Japan is the Gensaki or RP rate, while
for the United States the 3-month Treasury bill rate is used.
There is no comparable Treasury bill in Japan.
interbank market, since this is the market in which the
Bank of Japan performs daily operations. Currently
there are two markets in which Japanese banks ex-
change reserves. There is the call market, which is a
short-term market analogous to the federal funds mar-
ket, and there is a bill discount market where commer-
cial bills are discounted. The maturity of loans in the call
market varies from one-half day to three weeks, while
the maturity of bills traded in the bills discount market
varies from 30 to 180 days.
5
Over the period from 1975 to present, there have
been a number of changes liberalizing the movements
of rates in these markets. Prior to 1978, both the call
rate and bill discount rate were based on a quotation
system in which the rate was determined by a consen-
sus of major borrowers and lenders. During this period
the call rate was changed only once or twice a month
while the bill rate fluctuated less frequently. Also,
participants in the bill market were prohibited from
rediscounting bills. Starting in June 1978, however,
quotations on the call rate were changed more fre-
quently and permission was given to resell bills freely
one month after their purchase. In October 1978
seven-day call money with a freely determined rate was
introduced, while in November one-month bills were
5 The maximum term of call loans was extended from seven days to
three weeks in August 1985 while the maximum term in bill discount
market was extended from 120 days to 180 days in June 1985.
introduced at an unregulated rate. Also, rates on three-
month bills were liberalized. The process of liberalizing
the interbank market was largely concluded in 1979. In
April the quotation system in the call market was
abolished and call money with terms between two and
six days was introduced. In October rates on two-
month bills were also liberalized. Thus from late 1979
until the present, rates in both the call and bill market
could fluctuate on a daily basis and interdaily fluctuation,
although infrequent, did occur.
6 However, rates do not
fluctuate quite as freely as in the federal funds market.
This may be due to the fact that interest rates are used
as an operating target. Specifically, the Bank of Japan
stands ready to supply or absorb funds at its target
rates in order to achieve equilibrium in the short-term
money markets.
The volume of trading in the call and bill markets has
increased threefold over the last decade with monthly
volume in June of 1985 reaching Y13.4 trillion. The
market is therefore quite active in allocating funds
among banks.
Detailed Organization of the lnterbank Market
Call Market The major participants in the call
market are the Bank of Japan, the six Tanshi Kaisha or
dealers, city banks, long-term credit banks, regional
banks, mutual loan and savings banks, trust banks,
foreign bank branches, Norin Chukin Bank (the central
cooperative of agriculture and forestry credit unions),
and insurance companies. Also, beginning in November
1980, securities companies that are authorized to un-
derwrite public and corporate debentures have gradual-
ly been allowed to take funds in this market.’ City
banks are the major takers (demanders of funds) in the
call market while the major placers are Norin Chukin
Bank, trust banks, regional banks, and life insurance
companies. Regarding the Nor-in Chukin Bank, pro-
ceeds from the rice crop and other agricultural products
flow into this institution making its supply of funds vary
seasonally. The supply of funds originating with regional
banks is also significant but fluctuates seasonally.
These regional banks are particularly big suppliers
when central government subsidies are paid to local
governments.
With respect to the actual workings of the markets,
the Tanshi Kaisha are the pivotal figures both with
regard to the implementation of the Bank of Japan’s
6 Another movement toward liberalization occurred in November
1980 which allowed institutions to simultaneously borrow in one
market and lend in the other.
7 For a more detailed listing and description of institutions participat-
ing in this market see Short-Term Fund Market in Japan [1983].
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various participants. This is because almost all call fund
transactions must involve a Tanshi Kaisha as a counter-
party. Also, the link between the Tanshi Kaisha and the
Bank of Japan is much closer than the link between U.S.
dealers and the Federal Reserve. The Tanshi Kaisha,
in some instances, seem to operate as if they were
under the direct supervision of the Bank of Japan.
8 At
the beginning of each day, the Tanshi Kaisha quote the
placers’ rate (takers’ rate is usually l/16 higher).
Placers and takers then submit orders with the Tanshi
Kaisha. Unlike the federal funds market, each repaid
transaction, with the exception of half-day calls (i.e.,
call loans that are initiated and repayed on a particular
morning or afternoon), requires collateral.’ At the
initially quoted rate demand and supply may not be
equalized and the rate may change (an occasional
occurrence), or the Bank of Japan may enter the
market late in the day and supply or absorb funds as
needed. There are primarily four means for absorbing
funds in the call market. One is the sale of Treasury
bills to the market at a rate that is based on the mean of
the bill discount rate and the Gensaki rate (the Japanese
equivalent of the rate charged on long-term repurchase
agreements in the United States). 
10 A second method
is through the sale of bills drawn on the Bank of Japan
(Bank of Japan bills), while a third method is the sale of
commercial bill in the Bank of Japan’s portfolio directly
to city banks. A fourth method, which accounts for
roughly 30 percent of the absolute volume of monthly
reserve operations, is the use of the discount window
to change the volume of outstanding loans to banks. In
the case of absorbing funds the volume of loans would
be decreased. Supplying extra funds to the call market
is accomplished by reversing the transactions just
described.
In employing the various methods of reserve opera-
tions the Bank of Japan tries to take into account the
nature of the reserve deficiency or excess. If it appears
that conditions in the reserve market will persist, the
Bank of Japan conducts operations with long-term
government bonds. Seasonal, or short-term reserve
fluctuations, are primarily met through the use of
8 The exact nature of the relationship between the Tanshi Kaisha and
the Bank of Japan is not clearly defined, but there is certainly a much
more detailed flow of information and consultation between these
parties than exists between the corresponding institutions in the
United States.
9 Starting in July 1985 noncollateralized call loans of all maturities
have been allowed. They still represent a small portion of overall call
market volume.
10 Treasury bills are sold by the government at yields well below
market. Consequently the Bank of Japan purchases all Treasury bills.
commercial bills when there is a need to add reserves
and by selling Treasury bills or Bank of Japan bills when
there is a desire for draining reserves. Discount win-
dow lending is the major avenue for supplying or
absorbing reserves in response to daily fluctuations.
Thus, the type of transaction conducted by the Bank of
Japan in response to reserve market conditions may
serve as a valuable source of information to participants
in the interbank market. For example, an excess
demand for reserves that is met by a purchase of long-
term bonds could indicate that the prevailing level of
interest rates is consistent with the long-run policy
objectives of the Bank of Japan. The use of different
operations as a potential signal and the effects that
signaling has on the equilibrium conditions in the inter-
bank market is explored in more detail in Section VI.
The types of call loans are quite varied and provide a
great deal of funding flexibility. Transactions are gener-
ally in multiples of y-100 million and range in term from
one-half day to three weeks. There are also uncondi-
tional calls that are automatically renewed if no notice is
given prior to 1:00 p.m. (11:30 a.m. on Saturday). The
rate applicable to the renewed call is the rate prevailing
at the time of reserve settlement. Half-day calls are of
two types, morning and afternoon. A morning call fund
begins at 9:00 a.m. and lasts until the first daily clearing
settlement at 1:00 p.m. (11:30 a.m. on Saturday). An
afternoon call fund begins at the end of the first
settlement and ends at final settlement (3:00 p.m. on
weekdays and 1200 noon on Saturday). These calls are
used when a bank expects large withdrawals or depos-
its that will be reversed later in the day and are a direct
result of twice a day settlement of reserve balances.
Bill Discount Market The bill discount market is
also an active market for transferring interbank funds
over a longer time interval and is analogous to the term
market in federal funds, although the bill discount
market may be somewhat deeper. Currently there are
four terms of bills that are transacted with the transac-
tion size in multiples of 100 million. The shortest term
is 30 days while the longest term is 180 days with terms
of maturity varying anywhere between 30 and 180
days. Bills may also be rediscounted after they have
been held for one month, and there is no minimum
holding time for future rediscounts. Also, when redis-
counting, the Tanshi Kaisha involved in the original
discount is usually given priority in buying the bill back.
Bills that may be used in this market are original bills
which consist of commercial bills, prime industrial bills,
trade bills, prime single-name papers, and yen denomi-
nated export/import usance bills. Cover bills, which are
bills that financial institutions draw on themselves and
that are secured by original bills, are also used and
currently constitute almost all of the transactions.
18 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1986Bill discount rates are quoted each day by each
Tanshi Kaisha. As with call money rates, these rates
may not clear the market. The rate may change during
the day, but the usual practice is for the Bank of Japan
to enter the market and supply or absorb the necessary
funds. The Bank of Japan participates in the bill market
by drawing bills for sale on the Bank of Japan, buying
and selling original or cover bills through Tanshi Kaisha,
or directly dealing with financial institutions. The initial
use of Bank of Japan bills was to provide collateral to
Tanshi Kaisha in the call market, but with the growth of
the bill market the Tanshi Kaisha may also be autho-
rized to rediscount these bills. Regarding the use of
cover bills, the Bank of Japan informs the Tanshi Kaisha
of its intentions and the Tanshi Kaisha acting as brokers
find institutions willing to participate in the transaction.
From the above description it is evident that the call
and bill discount markets constitute active, deep, and
well-diversified markets that allow financial institutions
to allocate funds among themselves. It is also clear that
this market gives the Bank of Japan flexibility in terms






Over the last decade the Bank of Japan has success-
fully implemented a monetary policy that has been less
inflationary than the policies of most developed nations.
It has accomplished this with daily operating proce-
dures that are not based on procedures that many
monetarists advocate. For example, the Bank of Japan
uses the interbank market rates as its operating target
rather than total reserves. Further the reserve ac-
counting regime is not contemporaneous, but is a
mixture of contemporaneous and lagged reserve ac-
counting. Specifically, the deposit base used to calcu-
late required reserves for a given month is based on
deposits for that month. Average reserve balances
used to meet this requirement are held from the 16th
day of that month to the 15th day of the next month.
Also, the Bank of Japan does not place a great deal of
weight on short-term movements in money but seems
to be quite concerned with producing a low inflationary
environment for the economy. While the long-run
policy of the Bank of Japan appears to take seriously
some monetarist proposals, its method of operation
does not seem to be that prescribed by mainstream
monetarists.
In comparison the Federal Reserve also uses inter-
bank market rate (i.e., the federal funds rate), either
directly on indirectly through a borrowed reserve
targeting scheme, as its operating instrument.
11 The
Federal Reserve does, however, basically use a system
of contemporaneous reserve accounting which is gen-
erally recommended by monetarists. Also, the Fed,
like the Bank of Japan, does not target total reserves
nor does it seem to be overly concerned with short-
term movements in monetary aggregates. Over the
long run, as evidenced by the data in Section II, the
Federal Reserve seems less committed to price stabil-
ity than the Bank of Japan.
The description of the Bank of Japan’s operations in
the interbank markets is certainly consistent with the
use of an interest rate instrument. Call rates do not
frequently fluctuate on an intraday basis. 
12 The Tanshi
Kaisha, with close informational contact with the Bank
of Japan, set the rates at the opening of the markets and
the Bank of Japan stands willing to supply or absorb the
necessary funds.
Discount Window Lending
While direct open market operations in the call and
bill discount markets form an integral part of monetary
policy, the Bank of Japan has another extremely impor-
tant and flexible means of influencing conditions in the
interbank markets. This instrument is the discount
window and it operates in a very different manner from
the discount window in the United States.
In Japan, the discount window is an extremely
important avenue for supplying funds to banks. As
shown in Chart 4, the level of discount window borrow-
ing frequently exceeds the level of required reserves. 
13
By comparison, in the United States the ratio of
borrowed reserves to required reserves rarely ex-
ceeds 5 percent.
The administration of the discount window is also
very different in the two countries. In the United States
banks initiate the decision to borrow and the borrowing
privilege is subject to a complex non-price rationing
scheme.
14 In Japan, the Bank of Japan decides on the
level of bank borrowing up to a predetermined quarter-
ly ceiling, the term of the borrowing, and therefore the
effective interest rate associated with borrowing. Also,
11 For a detailed introduction to monetary policy see Goodfriend
[1982] or Goodfriend and Whelpley [1986].
12 However, there is a trend of increasing intraday fluctuations. This
is especially so since the mid-1980s.
13 In Japan, some of the large fluctuations in discount window lending
are due to the large fluctuations in currency holdings by the public.
Currency is supplied elastically by lending the needed reserves to
banks.
14 For a detailed analytical model of the discount window and bank
borrowing behavior in the United States see Goodfriend [1983].
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DISCOUNT WINDOW BORROWINGS/REQUIRED RESERVES
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
the interaction between city banks and the Bank of
Japan through the discount window constitutes an
important line of communication between banks and the
monetary authority.
Borrowings from the Bank of Japan are usually at a
subsidized rate, although the amount of the subsidy
varies with the term of the loan. The variation in
subsidy occurs, because accounting practices at the
discount window require an extra day’s interest pay-
ment on any loan. Thus a one-day loan requires two
days’ interest and is therefore usually associated with a
penalty rate, while a nine-day loan requires ten days’
worth of interest and thus is made at a subsidized rate.
Therefore, as the length of the loan increases the
effective interest rate approaches the official discount
rate and the amount of subsidy increases. This proce-
dure makes it undesirable for a bank to be caught with a
severe shortage of reserves near the end of a reserve
maintenance period, since any discount window loans (if
the loans are forthcoming) would by definition be for a
short period of time. Further, if a bank should fail to
meet its reserve requirement, it must borrow at a one-
day rate or pay a penalty of 3.75 percent above the
official discount rate on the amount of the reserve
deficiency. Given the accounting practices, this would
amount to a severe penalty and banks, therefore, are
rarely in this position.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
(Year)
The large volume of discount window borrowings
means that the Bank of Japan is able to confer substan-
tial subsidies to individual banks. This practice may also
give the Bank of Japan some leverage in influencing
bank behavior, a process referred to as “window
guidance,” although the extent and effectiveness of this
activity is open to debate. 
15
In administering the discount window, the Bank of
Japan basically has the ability to call up each city bank
and tell it how much it will borrow on any given day.
The length of the borrowing need not, and is not
generally, specified. However, since borrowing usually
amounts to a subsidy, city banks never refuse the
amount offered. A refusal could end up reducing future
subsidization as well. The basic elements involved in
the use of the discount window seem somewhat arbi-
trary. However, the actual use of discount window
borrowing in the conduct of monetary policy is per-
formed in a more subtle manner.
A member of the banking division of the Bank of
15 There are two distinct usages of the term window guidance. One
refers to directing the credit expansion of banks on a quarterly basis,
while the other refers to shorter term behavior in the interbank
market. It will be shown that the former interpretation is difficult to
understand as a means of controlling credit in an equilibrium context
(for a more detailed critique of the first definition see Horiuchi [1984].
20 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1986Japan is given oversight responsibilities of each city
bank. Officials at each bank communicate their expect-
ed funding needs over a reserve maintenance period
and they also have close contact with the members of
the Bank of Japan. The Bank of Japan usually gives
them very general information concerning its outlook
on money market conditions and on the method of fund
supply (bills purchase, loans, etc.). This communication
is not exact and is not a commitment by the Bank of
Japan. If for some unexpected reason the reserve
positions of banks are not behaving in a manner consis-
tent with policy objectives, discount window lending is
adjusted.
The Bank of Japan has the ability to use the term of
loans to signal expected future money market condi-
tions. In an effort to maximize profits, banks attempt to
satisfy their reserve requirements by holding higher
than average reserve balances when the call rate is
relatively low just as they seek to economize on
reserve balances when they believe that the call rate is
relatively high. By suggesting the amount of lending
that will be forthcoming and the future looseness or
tightness that can be expected in the interbank market,
the Bank of Japan can influence the expectations of
future call rates. In doing so the pattern of reserve
accumulation can be changed without movement in the
current call rate.
This communication of information to the banking
system may be an important component of window
guidance. There are many different views of window
guidance in Japan and there is debate over the extent to
which it is used. One interpretation is that since the
Bank of Japan is able to confer subsidies on city banks
who are regular borrowers, it has power to influence
bank behavior without resorting to market mecha-
nisms. While there may be some truth to this claim, it is
difficult to see in any equilibrium context why such a
policy would be useful in obtaining the objectives of
price stability or desired long-run money growth. In the
case of money, equilibrium of the demand for and
supply of money is achieved through movements in
interest rates and prices. Since the targeted level of
money must lie on the demand curve for money,
market rates must adjust so that the demand for money
is consistent with the target. Moral suasion with re-
spect to banks can not alter this.
Another interpretation of window guidance is given
by Yasuda [1981]. In his view, because loan supply is
determined by both today’s call rate and the future path
of call rates, the movement of today’s call rate will not
have a large immediate effect on bank behavior. This
lack of sensitivity by banks to current call market
conditions implies that the Bank of Japan would have to
initiate drastic movements in the call rate in order to
generate a contemporaneous response. Rather than
actually doing so, the Bank signals (or threatens) that it
will do so if banks do not alter their behavior. The signal
is a rise in the official discount rate. City banks, upon
observing this signal, find it optimal to lower their
supply of loans thus preventing the Bank of Japan from
following through on its threat. Technically, this behav-
ior is viewed as part of a cooperative game. The
cooperative nature of the game results from direct
communication between banks, although it would be
possible for the Bank of Japan to transmit information.
The implicit assumption in this theory is that banks
have fairly static expectations of future call rates. For
instance, if banks (1) had the same information set as
the Bank of Japan, (2) knew the policy objective, and (3)
formed expectations rationally, they should be able to
discern the effects of any deviations from policy objec-
tives on the expected future path of the call rate. Thus,
if a rise in the call rate is called for because money is
growing too fast, banks’ expectations of future call rates
should rise as well and no dramatic swings in interest
rates are needed to generate a contemporaneous re-
sponse. There is therefore no need for moral suasion.
The position taken here is that what is normally
called window guidance is largely a signaling process in
which the Bank of Japan communicates some informa-
tion that it alone possesses. This information may
result from observations of aggregate reserve balances
or aggregate money balances that would not be ob-
served by individual banks. The seeming complexity of
the relationship between the Bank of Japan and individ-
ual banks may indicate that more than just a signaling
process is going on, but signaling is certainly an
important part of the relationship.
VI.
A MODEL OF DISCOUNT WINDOW GUIDANCE
16
General Set Up
In this section the effects of signaling through win-
dow guidance (and similarly through different types of
reserve supply procedures) are investigated. Particular
attention is given to the way in which signaling affects
the behavior of the call market rate. It is shown that
signaling can lower the variance of the call rate forecast
error but that it also raises the variance of the call rate.
Since the Bank of Japan may be interested in lowering
both variances, signaling implies a tradeoff that could
result in the use of a noisy signal.
The model used to investigate the effects of window
16 The material in this section is quite technical and the reader may
wish to skip to the summary.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 21guidance is one in which the Bank of Japan pegs the
interest rate. Detailed studies of an interest rate
instrument are found in McCallum [1981, 1984], Dot-
sey and Ring [1983, 1986], and Canzoneri, Henderson,
and Rogoff [1983]. In all these studies the interest rate
is used as a policy instrument and the pegging scheme
is related to a money supply rule.
uncorrelated normally distributed random variable with
variance o
2
n It is also uncorrelated with vt. Output
demand disturbances have some persistence but gradu-
ally dampen over time.
For the purpose of this article, the exactness of detail
found in these papers is not necessary. Rather the
Bank of Japan’s objective is postulated in terms of a
price level target, while its instrument is the interbank
rate. Casting the analysis in terms of money supply
targets (or growth rates) would not alter the qualitative
results of the model. Further, it is unclear whether the
Bank of Japan uses long-term money growth as an
intermediate target or merely as an information variable
for achieving a desired price level or inflation rate. For
example, the Bank of Japan does not announce any
monetary targets, but merely gives a forecast of money
growth that is consistent with its policies. Also, over
the past four years when prices have been fairly stable,
money growth rates have fluctuated more than prices,
varying between annual growth rates of 7.1 and 9.6
percent while inflation has only varied between 0.8 and
1.65 percent. On the basis of the data it would be
diffcult to discriminate between which policy is actually
in effect.
The timing of the model works in the following
manner. At each half period (t - l/2, t, t + l/2, etc.)
the interbank market meets and the call rate (rt-1/2, rt,
rt+1/2) is determined. The one period nominal rate it is
related to the call rate by the arbitrage condition it = rt
+ Etrt+1/2 where the information set I, contains the
information in I*t-1,2 plus observation of rt, it, and pt.
Output markets also meet at the beginning of each half
period, but prices and output are determined for a
period one unit in length. The model is, therefore,
similar to Fischer’s [1977] overlapping contracts model
and is schematically, depicted in the figure below.
Fischer’s Overlaping Contracts Model
The basic model used for analyzing the signaling
effects of window guidance is a somewhat standard
rational expectations macro-model. However, in this
model decisions in the interbank market are assumed to
be made over a shorter time interval than decisions in
the output market. Specifically, the interbank market
period is assumed to be half that of the output market.
The policy of the Bank of Japan is to target the price
level, p*, and therefore produce stable prices. While
this is a simplification of the actual policy process it is a
convenient device for examining the role of signaling.
The instrument used for implementing policy is the call
market rate. In order to investigate the effect of
signaling, the model will be solved with and without
signaling. It is assumed that the Bank of Japan pos-
sesses full current information and that in the case of
signaling it accurately communicates this information to
market participants.
The log of output supply (y
s
t) is positively related to
unanticipated movements in the log of the price level
(pt) and is depicted by:
(1)
where E* t-1/2 is the conditional expectations operator
based on the information set I* t-1/2. I*t-1/2 contains all
prices, quantities, and disturbances dated t - 1/2 and
earlier. The disturbance ut is a random walk that
reflects technological innovations and is equal to ut- i +
vt where vt is a mean zero serially uncorrelated normal-
ly distributed random variable with variance of o
2
v
The Solution without Signaling
Given the assumptions concerning the information
possessed by the Bank of Japan (i.e., it knows vt and nt)
it can set the call rate rt so that the price level will equal
p* exactly. This rate is given by:
(3)





The log of output demand (y
d
t) is negatively related to
the expected real rate of interest, it + pt - E* t- 1/2 pt+1,
where it is the one period nominal rate. This relation-
ship is given by
(2)
Because this procedure produces a price of p* each
period, expectations of the current and future price
level will be p*. Therefore, (3) can be rewritten as
(4)
where wt = and nt is a mean zero serially Using the method of undetermined coefficients yields
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(5)
where
Analogously, if the Bank of Japan accurately reveals
vt and nt to the market, then
(6)
Equations (5) and (6) can be updated and used to
calculate the conditional forecast error of next period’s
call rate under conditions of signaling and no signaling
(see Appendix). One observes that the accuracy of the
forecast in terms of the conditional variance of the
forecast error generally improves with signaling, imply-
ing that providing information is desirable from the
standpoint of improving market forecasts. However,
the ability of the Bank of Japan to control the price level
is not affected by whether or not it provides additional
information to the market.*’ Therefore, the effects of
signaling are not a major determinant in determining the
success or failure of monetary policy.
A more exact treatment of this process would endow
the monetary authority with superior rather than com-
plete information. One might reasonably believe that
observing aggregate reserve behavior would only
transmit a signal to the Bank of Japan that was a linear
combination of real and money demand disturbances.
This would imply that the price level would deviate
from its targeted value as a result of expectational
errors on the part of the Bank of Japan. This would
make the agent’s signal extraction problem more com-
plex but would not alter the basic result that the
communications involved in window guidance reduce
the forecast error variance of future call rates.
In general the type of signaling that occurs through
window guidance is not precise. This is in part due to
17 This result would also apply to monetary targeting. It would also
apply to situations where the Bank of Japan had imperfect knowledge
of current shocks, but where the information set of market partici-
pants was a subset of the information possessed by the Bank of Japan.
the fact that the Bank of Japan does not possess
complete information. However, it may also in part be
due to a desire to smooth movements in the call rate by
reducing the variance of rt+1/2 - rt Analysis of U.S.
monetary policy indicates that this is an objective of
Federal Reserve behavior (see Goodfriend [1986a],
[1986b], and Dotsey [1986]), and it also may be
important to the Bank of Japan. If so, one can show that
signaling increases the variance of rt+ 1/2 - rt and hence
a desire to smooth interest rates would make signaling
undesirable. The presence of a desire for both better
forecasting and smoother interest rates would imply
the use of a noisy signal.
VII.
SUMMARY
This article gives a description of operating proce-
dures used by the Bank of Japan and concludes that it is
not operating procedures that distinguish the different
macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in Japan
and the United States. In fact, Japan achieves results
that are monetarist in nature without using the proce-
dures frequently advocated by monetarists. This indi-
cates that attempts to understand the general behavior
of monetary authorities should be focused on areas
other than operations.
In analyzing Japanese monetary policy, the article
presents a description of the environment in which
policy is implemented and finds that this environment is
quite similar to that of the United States. One major
difference, however, is the discount window and it is
analyzed in detail. A model is derived based on the
premise that an important aspect of window guidance is
its use as a signaling device. This behavior is shown to
affect the forecastibility and variance of call rate move-
ments, two subjects that are likely to concern any
monetary authority. The use of a noisy signal is
consistent with a tradeoff between improving the fore-
cast error variance of future call rates and smoothing
the variability of interest rates. However, while win-
dow guidance is an interesting and important part of
Japanese monetary policy it does not appear to account
for the lower inflation experienced by the Japanese
economy.
APPENDIX
To calculate the conditional variance of the forecast
error of next periods call rate, rt+1/2, first update
equations (5) and (6) and subtract Etrt+1/2 where the
information set depends on whether or not the Bank of
Japan signals the value of vt and nt. Without signaling,
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Let the conditional variance of the forecast error
without signaling be denoted by CV. With signaling,
(A2)
Denote the conditional variance of the forecast error
with signaling by CV*. Then using (Al) and (A2) it can
be shown that CV > CV* if and only if
For Therefore, signaling is
likely to improve the quality of market forecasts.
With respect to the variance of rt+l/2 - rt, using (5)
yields
(A3)
The signaling case employs (6) to give,
(A4)
It can be shown that the variance of rt+1/2 - rt is
greater under signaling if and only if
which is the case for finite variances of output supply
and demand shocks and for
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